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Abstract
We consider a noncooperative twoplayer game with payo functions of a special type
for which standard existence theorems and algorithms for searching Nash equilibrium
solutions are not applicable The problem statement is motivated by situations arising in
the process of determining a time for starting the construction of a new gas pipeline and
a time of putting it into operation The paper develops the approach suggested in 

Key words noncooperative twoperson game best reply Nash equilibrium application
to energy problems
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 Introduction
We construct and analyse a gametheoretic model related to the process of making deci
sions on the design and commercialization of new gas pipelines We consider a developing
gas market with increasing demand for which new pipelines delivering gas from dierent
natural gas elds  and thus acting as competitors in a game  are being planned Evi
dently the appearance of every new player in the market leads to a decrease in the sales
returns for the existing gas pipelines Therefore a reasonable argument is that the earlier
a player enters the market the greater total prot this player should receive In the same
time the present value of the construction cost is decreasing whereas gas demand and gas
prices are expected to be increasing over time Therefore a reasonable delay in entering
the market may be preferable The above argument leads to a gametheoretic problem
formulation in which the points in time at which the gas suppliers enter the market act
as crucial decisions
In  an adequate gametheoretic model is proposed The problem is formalized as
a noncooperative game in which the times of entering the market commercialization
times play the role of control variables The players benet is dened as the total prot
gained during the pipelines constructionoperation period The model includes a set of
assumptions on the market price formation mechanism the game is considered with the
innite time horizon functions dening benet rates and costruction costs are supposed to
be monotonously decreasing For the case of two players an analytic solution was obtained
and an algorithm for searching Nash equilibrium solutions was proposed In  	  a
computer realization of that algorithm including such options as data approximation and
generating forecasts was developed An application to data on Turkeys gas market was
suggested
In subsequent research attempts have been made to extend the developed approach
in particular Chinas natural gas market has been considered However assumptions
admissible for Turkeys gas market turned out to be unt in the case of Chinas gas
market A key economic distinction was that in China the price formation mechanism
could not be viewed as purely marketdriven In 
 a relevant modication of the model
was described and results of databased simulation of the operation of planned pipelines
delivering gas from Russia to China were presented
In the present paper we suggest a new mathematical model that takes into account
the phenomena mentioned above We use an approach similar to that developed in 
however the assumptions we impose here are signicantly dierent from  and sometimes
opposite to  those adopted in 
   
The main features of our model are the following The process of constructionoperation
of competing gas pipelines has a nite time horizon The players prot rate returns are
monotonously increasing not monotonically decreasing over time The construction cost
is constant for each player A players payo to be minimized is dened to be a function
of the length of the period of the return of the investment cost the payback period and
of the time at which the player enters the market
The results presented in this paper provide a theoretical basis for the elaboration of a
decision support system applicable for planning energy infrastructures in situations where
the price formation mechanisms may not be marketdriven
 Problem Formulation Notations and Assumptions
Our model assumes that two players participants develop their gas pipline projects for
the same gas market The models main variables and parameters are the following
Participants benet rates The benet rate for participant i i    is described by
two functions 
i 
t and 
i
t 
i 
t denes the benet rate for participant i if partic
ipant i is a monopolist in the market and 
i 
t denes the benet rate for participant
i if participant i if both participants occupy the market The presence of the opponent
reduces the benet rate for participant i therefore 
i 
t  
i
t for all t in a given time
interval  T  represending the life period for the participants projects Let us denote by
t
 
and t

the points in time at which participants  and  enter the market respectively
Then the benet rates for the participants are dened by

 
tjt

 
 

  
t if t  t


 
t if t  t




tjt
 
 
 

 
t if t  t
 


t if t  t
 

The prots participant  and participant  gain on a time interval t
 
 t
 
 are
R
t
 

t
 

 
t j
t

dt and
R
t
 

t
 


t j t
 
dt respectively We assume the functions 
ij
to be dierentiable
concave and monotonously increasing on  T  The assumption that the benet rates are
increasing over time is motivated by modeling and forcasting results for Chinas natural
gas market This assumption is dierent from that suggested in 
Construction cost Payback period We assume that the construction costs are xed
and denoted by C
i
 i    We also assume the interval  T  to be so large that the
construction costs are covered by the market sales
T
Z


i
tdt  C
i
 
Let us dene times t
i
 t
i
 t
 
i
 t
  
i
as follows
t
i

t
i
Z


i 
tdt  C
i
 t
i

T
Z
t
i

i
tdt  C
i

t
 
i

t
 
i
Z


i
tdt  C
i
 t
  
i

T
Z
t
  
i

i 
tdt  C
i
 
   
Clearly t
i
is the payback period for project i provided participant i enters the market at
time t   while the the other participant never enters the market t
i
 t
 
i
 t
  
i
are interpreted
similarly
In what follows we assume that the nal time T is large enough in comparison with
all time characteristics of the projects Namely the following relations are supposed to be
true
As sump t i o n  It holds that
t
 
i
 t
i
 i    	
Note that under Assumption  the next inequalities hold true   t
i
 t
 
i
 t
i
 t
  
i

T  The value 
i
 
i
t
 
 t

 dened by
t
i

i
Z
t
i

i
t j t
j
dt  C
i
 
will be called the payback period for project i here j    j  i In the next section
we will describe properties of 
i
t
 
 t


Goals of control payo functions The problem we consider in this paper assumes that
each participant tries to achieve two goals to minimize hisher payback period 
i
t
 
 t


and to minimize the commercialization time for hisher project  the time t
i
 at which
the project enters the market The participants may have dierent priorities for these two
criteria and thus choose dierent waits for them The participants control variables are
 as in 	  their commercialization times t
i
 Thus the payo function participant i
minimizes through the choice of hisher commercialization time t
i
is
f
i
t
 
 t

j 
i
  
i
t
i

i
t
 
 t

 

here 
i
is a weight coecient   
i
  With 
i
  both criteria are equitable in case

i
  one has the unique criterion  the payback period
In what follows we consider two problems The rst problem consists in optimization
for one participant while the choice of the other participant is xed We formulate this
problem for participant  only
P ro b l em  Construct the generally multivalued	 function t

 
 t

 
t

j 
 
 such that
f
 
t

 
 t

j 
 
  min
t
 
f
 
t
 
 t

j 
 
 
In a standard terminology of game theory t

 
 t

 
t

j 
 
 is the best reply of participant
 to strategy t

of participant 
Similarly we introduce the best reply t


 t


t
 
j 

 of participant  to strategy t
 
of
participant 
The other problem consists in nding Nash equilibrium solutions in the corresponding
twoplayer game Using the introduced notations we formulate it in the following way
P ro b l em  Find pairs f
b
t
 

b
t

g such that
b
t
 
 t

 

b
t

j 
 

b
t

 t



b
t
 
j 



   
 Properties of Payback Periods
Let us study the function 
 
 
 
t
 
 t

 For 

 

t
 
 t

 similar results can be
obtained through a change of the indices
First of all let us specify the domain of denition of 
 
 
 
t
 
 t

 ie determine
the set D
 
  T    T  in which equation  has a solution For this purpose
introduce the following variable Denote by t

 
 t

 
t

 the time such that
T
Z
t

 

 
t j t

dt  C
 

By Assumption  t

 
t

  t
 
if t

 t
 
 and if t

varies from t
 
to T  time t

 
t

 grows
from t
 
to t
  
 
 Thus D
 
is dened by the inequalities   t
 
 t

 
t

   t

 T 
Introduce the following functions of 	   T 
g

 g

	 
g

Z


 
t j 	dt  C
 

g
 
 g
 
	 
g
 
Z


  
tdt  C
 
g

 g

	 
g

Z


 
tdt  C
 

g

 g

	  g

	  T  t

 
	
g

 T  t
 

Note that g

t

  
 
 t

 and this function decreases on  t
 
 from t
 
 
to t
 
 Then as
	  t
 
g

	 	 t
 
 the function g
 
	  
 
	 T  is dened and decreases on  t
  
 
 from
g
 
  t
 
to T  t
  
 
 Similarly g

	  
 
	  is dened and decreases on  t
 
 from
g

  t
 
 
to T  t
 
 Finally g

t

 	 T  t
 
is dened on  t
 
 and decreases to T  t
  
 
on t
 
 T 
In what follows we consider the case where the following assumption is true
As sump t i o n  For each admissible t
 
it holds that

  
t
 
  
 
t
 
 g
 
t
 
 	
Assumption  imposes a relationship between the benet rates 
  
t and 
 
t and
the construction cost C
i
 This relationship holds provided the payback period for project
 is large compared to the variations of 
 j
t in a neighborhood of t
 

For a given t

 dene t

 
 t

 
t

 by
t

Z
t

 

  
tdt  C
 
 	
Note that t

 
 t

 
t

 is well dened and nonnegative for t

 t
 

   
L emma  In the set D
 
 the function 
 
 
 
t
 
 t

 is dened correctly and is con
tinuous In each interior point t
 
 t

 of D
 
such that t
 
 t

 
t

 and t
 
 t

 there exists
the partial derivative

 
t
 
t

	
t
 
and


 
t
 
 t



t
 












  
t
 


  
t
 
 g
 
t
 

 if   t
 
 t

 
t




  
t
 


 
t
 

 
t
 
 t


 if t

 
t

  t
 
 t




 
t
 


 
t
 
 g

t
 

 if t

 t
 
 T
		
P r o o f Since 
 
 
 
t
 
 t

 is dened as a solution of equation  with i   the
correctness of the denition of 
 
follows from the the denition of D
 
and properties of

ij
t Considering  as an equality dening an implicit function we derive 		
Lemma  allows us to describe the behaviour of 
 
 
 
t
 
 t

 in D
 
 First let us
consider 
 
t
 
 t

 as a function of t
 
 with t

xed
L emma  Let Assumptions 
 and  be true Then the payback period 
 
t
 
 t

 con
sidered as a function of t
 
 decreases on the interval  T  The derivative

 
t
 
t

	
t
 
is
negative and continuous everywhere in  T  except for two points t
 
 t

 
t

 and t
 
 t


At point t
 
 t

 
t

 the derivative

 
t
 
t

	
t
 
increases and at point t
 
 t

it decreases
For each t
 
 t

  D
 
the next inequalities hold
g
 
t
 
  
 
t
 
 t

  g

t
 
 	
P r o o f Inequalities 	 follows directly from the denitions of function 
 
t
 
 t


and functions g
 
t
 
 and g

t
 
 The other assertion of the lemma follows from an analysis
of the sign of

 
t
 
t

	
t
 
determined by 		 for various t
 
 t

  D
 
 For each of the
cases listed in 		 we have

 
t
 
 t

	
t
 
  due to the inequalities 
 j
t
 
  
 j
t
 

g
j
t
 
 j    following from the monotonicity assumption for 
ij
t the inequality

i 
t
 
  
i
t
 
 	 and 	
Fig  provide graphical illustrations of the above assertions for an example con
sidered in the last section In Fig  the graph of the benet rate is shown for xed
t

 t
 
 t
 
 The area of the shaded gure is C
 
 and its base is 
 
t
 
 t

   for
the arguments t
 
 
 t

  Fig  show the graphs of function 
 
t
 
 t

 and its
derivatives for two dierent values of t


Closing this section we characterize 
 
t
 
 t

 as a function of t


L emma  Let Assumptions 
 and  be true Then the payback period 
 
 
 
t
 
 t


considered as a function of t

 has the following properties Let a point t
 
  t
 
 be xed
Then 
 
t
 
 t

 is constant in the interval  t
 
 
 
t
 
 t

 	 g

t
 
 it decreases to g
 
t
 

in the interval t
 
 t
 
 g
 
t
 
 and it is constant again if t

 t
 
 g
 
t
 
 
 
t
 
 t

 	
g
 
t
 
 If t
 
 t
 
 t
  
 
 then 
 
t
 
 t

 is dened only for t

such that
T
R
t
 

 
t j t

dt  C
 

it decreases for t

 t
  
 
and is constant on t
  
 
 T 
 Best Reply Functions
As in the previous section we study the situation from the point of view of participant 
The goal of this section is to to solve Problem  ie to construct the best reply t

 
t

j 
 

of participant  to a strategy t

of participant  Recall that t

 
t

j 
 
 is dened in 
   
Fig The benet rate 
 
t
 
jt

 for t

   t
 
 t
 
 and the corresponding payback
period 
 
t
 
 t


Fig	 The derivative

 
t
 
 t

	
t
 
for two dierent values of t

 A  D are the
discontinuity points
   
Let us introduce the following notations
p
  
t 

  
t

  
t  g
 
t
 
p
 
t 

 
t

 
t  g

t
 
q
  
t 

  
t

 
t g
 
t
 	
q
 
t 

  
t

 
t g

t
 
L emma  Let Assumptions 
 and  be true Then the functions p
  
t p
 
t q
  
t
and q
 
t are continuous and monotonously increasing in their domains of denition
Noreover for each t the next inequalities hold
q
  
t  q
 
t  p
 
t q
  
t  p
  
t 

P r o o f The inequalities 
 follow directly from the assumed inequalities 
  
t 

 
t  g

t  g
 
t and the monotonicity of 
 j
t  To prove that p
  
t p
 
t q
  
t
and q
 
t are increasing let us estimate their derivatives We have
dp
  
t
dt

d
  
t
dt

  
t g
 
t 
  
t
d
  
dt
t  g
 
t 
dg
 
t
dt



  
t g
 
t

d
  
t
dt

  
t g
 
t 
  
t
d
  
dt
t  g
 
t  
  
t
d
  
dt
t g
 
tj
dg
 
t
dt
j


  
t g
 
t

Due to the monotonicity and concavity of 
  
t we have

  
t g
 
t  
  
t
and
d
  
t
dt

d
  
dt
t g
 
t
Therefore
dp
  
t
dt


  
t
d
  
dt
t g
 
tj
dg
 
t
dt
j


  
t g
 
t
 
The monotonicity of p
 
t q
  
t and q
 
t is stated similarly
Let us x an 
 
such that
q
  
   
 
 p
 j
t
  
 
 j    
and dene points t

 
 t

 
 t
q
 
and t
q

as solutions to the following equations
t

 
 p
  
t   
 

t

 
 p
 
t   
 

  	 
t
q
 
 q
  
t   
 

t
q

 q
 
t   
 

Note that such an 
 
  exists and the roots of the above equations are dened
uniquely Based on 
 
 we construct the function t

 
 t

 
t

j 
 
 which can be multi
valued at some points Due to inequalities 
 we have t
q
 
 t
q

 t

 
and t
q
 
 t

 

Generally there are several opportunities for the location of t

 
with respect to t

 
and t
q


In what follows we deal with the case
t
q
 
 t
q

 t

 
 t

 

other locations of t

 
can be studied similarly
Th e o r em  Let Assumptions 
 and  be true
a	 If   t

 t
q

 then t

 
t

j 
 
  t

 

b	 If t

 t
q

and t

t

  t
q
 
 then the set t

 
t

j 
 
 consists of one or two points

 
t

 and t

 
 where 
 
t

 is the unique solution to the equation

  

 


  

 
 
 

 
 t


  
 
 
c	 If t

 
t

  t
q
 
 then 
 
t
 
 t

  g
 
t
 
 and t
q
 
is the root of equation 	 If
t
q

 t

 
t

  t

 
 then the set t

 
t

j 
 
 contains the unique point t

 
t


d	 If t

is such that t

 
t

  t

 
 then the set t

 
t

j 
 
 contains the unique point t

 

P r o o f From Assumptions  and  and Lemmas  it follows that for 
 
specied
above the minimum of f
 
t
 
 t

j 
 
 with respect to t
 
is achieved only in the points where
the derivative

f
 
t
 
 t

j 
 


t
 
changes its sign from  to  the boundary points are
excluded The above derivative


 
t
 
 t



t
 

 
 has the same properties as


 
t
 
 t



t
 

Namely it has a structure shown in Fig 	 The curve located on the right to point
B see Fig 	 coincides with the graph of function p
 
 and while t

increases point B
moves along this curve In the same time point A belongs to the graph of function q
  
and moves along it Point C lies on curve q
 
 Finally point D moves along curve p
  

and the part of the graph of


 
t
 
 t



t
 
which is located on the left to D coincides with
curve p
  
 Note that for small t

points C and D vanish while as t

approaches the nal
time T points A and D vanish
The above properties and the relations between functions p
 j
and q
 j
allow us to
prove the theorem Let t

grow from zero to T  In case a point A lies below the line
l  f 	  
 
 and the signle minimum point is t

 
 In case b another possible minimum
point appears 
 
t

 Graphically it represents the intersection of line l and curve CA
Due to 	 starting from some value for t

 point t

 
becomes no longer suspicious
as a minimum point and the unique solution is 
 
t

 or t

 
t

 At the latter point the
function is discontinues case c As point D reaches line l we switch to curve p
  
and
nd the unique solution t

 
case d This nalizes the proof
Note that in the case under consideration the structure of function t

 
t

j 
 
 is similar
to the one presented in  but does not fully coincide with it Namely in  the domain
of denition of function t

 
t

j 
 
 consists of two intervals in each of which the function
  
 
is constant in our situation we also have two intervals and in one of them the function is
not constant it is constant only on a subinterval with the end point t

 t

 
t

  t

 

In section  we provide an example of a best reply function Fig 

 Nash Equilibrium Solutions
Recall that the domain of denition of function t

i
t
j
j 
i
 i j    i  j contains
an interval in which t

i
t
j
j 
i
 is not constant This fact makes it dicult to state the
existence of Nash equilibrium solutions straighforwardly and to dene an algorithm for
their construction
L emma  A pair f
b
t
 

b
t

g is a Nash equilibrium solution if and only if f
b
t
 

b
t

g considered
as a point on the t
 
 t

 plane belongs to both graphs t
 
 t

 
t

j 
 
 and t

 t


t
 
j 


plotted on the t
 
 t

 plane
The lemma follows straitforwardly from the denition of Nash equilibrium solutions
To nd Nash equilibrium solutions we use Theorem  and construct the curves indi
cated in Lemma 
 If these curves have common points these points represent the sought
Nash equilibrium solutions Fig  shows an example illustrating the case of two Nash
equilibrium solutions
In the rest of this section we construct an algorithm for searching Nash equilibrium
solutions in the case where the best reply functions are approximated by piecewiseconstant
functions This case is meaningful for practice A similar algorithm can also be applied
to more general situations when each participant has more than two scenarios for benet
rates which correspond to multiple operation modes for the gas pipelines In what follows
the set of Nash equilibrium solutions will be denoted as NEP
Let the best reply function for participant  t

 
 t

 
t

j 
 
 take a nite number of
values t

 n
 n       N in intervals 
n 
 
n
 respectively At points 
n
 n       N
the set t

 
t

j 
 
 consists of the two points t

 n
and t

 n 	
 Similarly for function
t


 t


t
 
j 

 we denote by t

m
the constant values it takes on intervals 
m 
 
m

respectively m      M  We set 

 

  
N
 
M
 T  We put the points
t

m
in the increasing order note that the boundaries of the intervals on which function
t


 t


t
 
j 

 takes values t

m
are not ordered
Let us describe a nitestep algorithm for nding the set NEP
A At step  mark points t

 
     t

k
 
 

 
 
 If there are no such points we go
to step  If such points exist for each m       k
 
we check the relation
t

 n
 
m 
 
m
 

If this relation holds true then the pair ft

 n
 t

m
g is attributed to the set NEP
A For an arbitrary step n we observe the index k
n 
formed at the previous step
k
n 
corresponds to points t

m
that have already been analyzed If k
n 
 M  the
algorithm stops If k
n 
 M  new points t

m
 
n 
 
n
 m  k
n 
 are marked and
a new value for k
n
is formed Next for m  k
n 
     k
n
one checks the relation 

The pairs ft

 n
 t

m
g for which 
 holds true are attributed to the set NEP If k
n
 M 
one unit is added to n and we go to step n   If k
n
 M  the algorithm stops
Th e o r em  In case of piecewiseconstant best reply functions algorithm A
	  A	
nds the set NEP of all Nash equilibrium solutions
   
	 Example
In this section we specify the above constructions for an example in which the benet
rates are linear Assume that

ij
t  a
ij
t  b
ij
 
where   a
i 
 a
i
   b
i
 b
i 
   t  T  i    In this case Assumption  holds if
a
i
T

 b
i
T  C
i
 
We easily nd explicit formulas for points t
 
i
 t
i
 t
i
and t
  
i
and function t

i
t
j
 i  j In
particular
t
 
i


a
i
b
i

q
b

i
 a
i
C
i

t
i


a
i
b
i

q
b

i
 a
i
a
i
T

 b
i
T  C
i

Let us also give formulas for 
i
t
 
 t

 and

f
 

t
 
in the simplest case where a
  
 a
 
 a
 

We have

 
t
 
 t

 










a
 
a
 
t
 
 b
  

p
a
 
t
 
 b
  


 a
 
C
 
   t
 
 t

 
t




a
 
a
 
t
 
 b
 

p
a
 
t
 
 b
 


 a
 
C
 
 b
  
 b
 
t

 t
 
 t

 
t

  t
 
 t



a
 
a
 
t
 
 b
 

p
a
 
t
 
 b
 


 a
 
C
 
 t

 t
 
 t

 
t



f
 

t
 











 
 
a
 
t
 
 b
  
p
a
 
t
 
 b
  


 a
 
C
 
  t
 
 t

 
t



 
 
a
 
t
 
 b
  
p
a
 
t
 
 b
 


 a
 
C
 
 a
 
b
  
 b
 
t

 t
 

t

 
t

  t
 
 t


 
 
a
 
t
 
 b
 
p
a
 
t
 
 b
 


 a
 
C
 
t

 t
 
 t

 
t


If   
 
  the expressions for t

 
and t

 
take the form
t

 


a
  

b
  
  
 

s
a
  
C
 

 
 
 



t

 


a
 

b
 
  
 

s
a
 
C
 

 
 
 



Assumption  imposes stronger constraints on parameter values Note that these con
straints are feasible we omit a rigorous formulation involving a number of technical de
tailes
We nalize the section by presenting some numerical results Let both participants
have same coecients in equality  dened as follows
a
ij
  b
i 
  b
i
 
 i j   
We set 
i
 
 T   C
i
  It is easy to nd points  We have t
 
i
 
t
i
 		 and Assumption  is true Functions 
i
t
i
jt
j
 and 
i
t
i
 t
j
 are shown in Fig
 The derivative of 
i
t
i
 t
j
 is shown in Fig 	 Finally Fig 
 present a graphical
illustration of the best reply function and Nash equilibrium solutions Note that in the
considered situation both participants have the same parameters the Nash solutions are
symmetrical see   and   
   
Fig
 Best reply function and Nash eqilibrium points

 Conclusion
This paper is motivated by the issue of planning and putting into operation new gas
pipeline systems We proposed a new problem setting reecting situations in which the
price formation mechanism had not a purely market character Mathematically we for
mulated the problem as a noncooperative twoperson game We analyzed the best reply
functions and described an algorithm for nding Nash equlibrium solutions in the game
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